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Abstract
This paper evaluates whether volunteering is imbued with altruistic or strategic 
reciprocity. Although scholars have intensively studied the motivations and social 
norms to volunteer, to date there is no agreement why human beings perform 
activities in which time is freely given up in order to benefit another person, group 
or organization. We argue that attitudes towards reciprocity and volunteering are 
related, but that this relationship becomes only visible if we refine the conceptual 
framework for both concepts. Using data from the Swiss Volunteering Survey 2009, 
the empirical results of our Bayesian multilevel models show the following: firstly, 
individuals exhibiting high levels of altruistic reciprocity are more likely to engage 
in informal volunteering; secondly, we find a negative relationship between altruist 
reciprocity and the individual likeliness to do voluntary work within non-solidary 
associations; thirdly, once individuals opted to engage in formal volunteering, 
we find that strategic reciprocity is clearly related to voluntary engagement in 
non-solidary associations. Overall, our conceptual foundation provides a more 
appropriate model to explain the formation of volunteering.
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Introduction
Nearly one billion people throughout the world volunteer through public, 
non-profit or for-profit organizations, or directly for friends or neighbours 
(cf. Salamon et al., 2011: 217). Although scholars have intensively studied 
the motives as to why human beings perform activities in which time is 
freely given up in order to benefit another person, group or organization, to 
date there exists no study referring to individual norms of reciprocity con-
stitutive of volunteering (Clary and Snyder, 1999; Dekker and Halman, 
2003; Mannino et al., 2011; Wilson, 2000). One might argue that this gap 
has remained unfilled for obvious reasons, since reciprocity and volunteer-
ing seem to be conceptually different. Captured by proverbial phrases such 
as “what goes around, comes around”, the concept of reciprocity represents 
the general idea that giving and receiving are mutually contingent (Gouldner, 
1960: 169). In other words, a reciprocal act implies that doing good is tied 
to the expectation that it will be compensated by future rewards. Volunteering, 
in contrast, is generally associated with selfless or charitable engagement to 
benefit the larger society (Putnam, 2000). As a consequence, one would 
expect that the decision to volunteer tends to be guided by intrinsic motiva-
tions (Deci, 1975) or warm-glow altruism (Andreoni, 1990) rather than by 
simple cost–benefit calculations. Common sense would therefore suggest 
that individuals who place great value on reciprocity would not engage in 
volunteering, which is considered an altruistic activity.
This reasoning seems, however, to be quite myopic. Several findings 
suggest that people’s motivations for performing unpaid work are very 
likely to be multifaceted, as volunteering takes many forms (Wilson, 2000: 
219). Thus, the stimulation to volunteer is usually perceived of as a combi-
nation of several motives, other-interested and self-interested alike (Haski-
Leventhal, 2009; Osteen, 2002; Silber, 2001). What is more, and although it 
goes against the common notion that all voluntary work is altruistic, it is 
undisputable that in many cases people volunteer for an activity only if it is 
in their interest to do so (Wilson, 2012: 182). Actors do weigh costs and 
benefits and will not contribute goods and services to others unless they 
profit from the exchange (Smith, 1981; Wilson, 2000: 222). According to 
the most radical proponents of this perspective, even in the areas of “human-
itarian service volunteering” (e.g. blood donation), altruism continues to 
play a minor role, resulting in the seeming paradox that there can be altruis-
tic organizations whose members are not generally altruists (cf. Smith, 
1981: 30). As with volunteering, there are diverse forms of reciprocity. 
Beyond the well-known form of strategic reciprocity chosen by rational, 
self-interested individuals, there exist more selfless reciprocal norms such 
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as altruistic reciprocity (cf. Diekmann, 2004). In other words, social behav-
iour is not guided in every respect by the norm of strategic reciprocity.
Against this backdrop, we aim to scrutinize the motivational roots of 
volunteering, placing individual attitudes towards norms of reciprocity at 
the centre of our analyses. We deliberately focus on reciprocal norms and 
not on other relevant norms in the context of volunteering, such as social 
responsibility or social justice, as this allows us to tackle the seeming oxy-
moron that volunteering can be both voluntary (e.g. non-compulsory) and 
a social obligation (Musick and Wilson, 2008: 81). We consider a lack of 
analytical differentiation as the main obstacle to obtaining more concise 
statements about the altruistic or strategic motivations of volunteering. 
Based on a more subtle conceptualization of volunteering as well as reci-
procity, the purpose of this contribution is to shed new light on the question 
of whether volunteering is driven by other-interested or self-interested 
motives. Accordingly, we distinguish between non-solidary/solidary for-
mal voluntary engagement and informal volunteering, on the one hand, and 
altruistic and strategic forms of reciprocity, on the other. We lay out a theo-
retical framework that unravels the mechanisms of the relationship between 
specific forms of reciprocity and volunteering and subject them to an 
empirical test. Using a new dataset on volunteering in Switzerland, we 
show theoretically and empirically that individuals exhibiting high levels 
of altruistic reciprocity are more likely to engage in informal volunteering, 
whereas elevated levels of strategic reciprocity coincide with a higher pro-
pensity for formal volunteering in associations, which do not mainly pur-
sue solidary purposes.
We contribute to the literature in several respects. Firstly, existing 
research on reciprocity is dominated by (experimental) game theoretical 
models showing how reciprocity facilitates cooperation and, thus, consti-
tutes a system stabilizing factor (Axelrod, 1984; Berger, 2011; Diekmann, 
2004; Franzen and Pointner, 2008; Gouldner, 1960). By investigating the 
relationship between reciprocity and volunteering with survey data, this 
study adds a new perspective to the understandings of this literature in 
addressing the question of how social norms structure pro-social behaviour 
in a representative sample. Secondly, the conceptual distinction between 
different forms of reciprocity and volunteering promises more concise 
insights regarding the question of altruistic or selfish motives underlying 
different forms of volunteering. In this vein, our study tries to provide new 
insights to the long-standing altruism–egoism debate often found in discus-
sions about helping regarding identity theory and motivational functional 
theory. Thirdly, most studies evaluating the motives of volunteering natu-
rally analyse only volunteers, thus neglecting the group of non-volunteers. 
In contrast, our analyses do not only distinguish between varying 
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motivations of volunteers themselves; individuals who do not do unpaid 
work serve as our – methodologically speaking – randomly assigned control 
group. Fourthly, we need not be content with the observation that it is a 
“purely empirical” question whether the foundations of volunteering are 
altruist or self-centred, as suggested by Wilson and Musick (1997: 694). 
Owing to the elaborate conceptual approach, we are able to show that 
whether volunteering is rather guided by altruistic reciprocal motives or by 
strategic reciprocity depends on the kind of voluntary activity.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin the next section with a dis-
cussion of the theoretical framework binding together reciprocity and vol-
unteering. Based on these conceptual foundations, we develop hypotheses 
specifying the relationship between reciprocity and volunteering. After 
explaining the measurement of our variables we conduct Bayesian multi-
level analyses in order to test these hypotheses. A discussion of the major 
findings concludes the paper.
Reciprocity and volunteering: Towards a 
theoretical framework
This study tries to link pro-social norms with pro-social behaviour. In par-
ticular, we ask whether volunteering is imbued with altruistic or strategic 
reciprocity. While there are many studies on reciprocity, and a lot on volun-
teerism, we find surprisingly no contribution that attempts to unite the two 
concepts in a systematic way. In the following, we discuss the concepts of 
reciprocity and volunteering, unveiling their manifold facets. Starting from 
this variety of meanings, we derive more subtle and clear-cut conceptualiza-
tions of reciprocity and volunteering in order to establish our argumentation 
of behavioural options.
Although the importance of reciprocity has been emphasized throughout 
the history of mankind, a unified and generally accepted definition of the 
term is not readily available. In reality, the idea that giving and receiving are 
mutually contingent, which underlies the concept of reciprocity, adopts 
manifold forms (cf. Berger, 2011; Diekmann, 2004; Franzen and Pointner, 
2008; Gouldner, 1960). To mention only a few distinctions: reciprocity does 
not only apply to benevolent actions, but may also be positive (reward) or 
negative (retaliation). Furthermore, reciprocity can imply that a good or ser-
vice is paid back by a different good or service of equal value (“tit-for-tat”) 
or by exactly the same good or service (“tat-for-tat”). In a similar vein, the 
recipient of a reciprocal act might be specified or unspecified. In the first 
case, individuals act according to the norm of generalized reciprocity, driven 
by the expectation that doing good will pay off some day, or because they 
want to return a service received in the past to  the  larger  community,  for 
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instance when parents agree to help out with scouting groups long after their 
own children are no longer members (Musick and Wilson, 2008: 99; 
Putnam, 2000: 134). Particularistic reciprocity, by contrast, sheds light on 
individual motives underlying reciprocal acts towards specific persons. The 
saying “if you want to be helped by others you must help them”, for instance, 
indicates that reciprocal behaviour might also be driven by egoistic motives. 
This leads to another important distinction between strategic and altruistic 
reciprocity, which is at the core of our analytical interest.1
As game theoretical models were able to demonstrate, it might be inter-
esting for purely egoistic and rational actors to adopt mutually conditional 
cooperative strategies such as reciprocal behaviour in repeated exchange 
situations (social dilemmas) (Axelrod, 1984; Diekmann, 2004: 489; Taylor, 
1976). If self-centred individuals know that there is a realistic chance for 
reward, that is, if the “shadow of the future” is large enough (Axelrod, 
1984), it is rational for them to reciprocate. This strategic form of reciproc-
ity is based on the mere belief in reciprocal behaviour (Perugini et al., 2003): 
in contexts in which individuals help someone because they consider it the 
best way to receive help in the future, reciprocity constitutes a strategic 
option chosen by rational, self-interested individuals. Here, reciprocity is 
not the end, but a means.
The model of strategic reciprocity, however, falls short when it comes to 
explaining reciprocal behaviour in situations where there are no prospects 
for reward, that is, in one-shot games. There are many non-repeated interac-
tions where reciprocal behaviour nevertheless occurs. Why should a person 
reciprocate a helpful act to a stranger when it is unlikely that they will ever 
meet again? Strategic reciprocity cannot explain why a foreigner traveller 
would honour the excellent service in a restaurant with a generous tip when 
he knows that he will never return to that place (Diekmann, 2004: 491). In 
these situations, reciprocal behaviour arises from an internalized motivation 
that is not necessarily accompanied by the belief that most people do it or 
that it is strategically advantageous to do so (Perugini et al., 2003: 254). To 
explain reciprocity in these contexts, Gouldner (1960: 174) coined the term 
“shadow of indebtedness”, which clearly refers to a moral obligation, to the 
altruistic compliance with a reciprocal norm. Accordingly, the tip example 
mentioned above reflects altruistic reciprocity (Berger, 2013; Diekmann, 
2004; Franzen and Pointner, 2008), which evokes obligations towards oth-
ers on the basis of their past behaviour rather than on the basis of expecta-
tions of future rewards. In these contexts, reciprocal behaviour is no longer 
a means, but the end to an action (Perugini et al., 2003: 252f).2
Volunteering, again, comprises helping behaviours and entails more 
commitment than spontaneous assistance but is narrower in scope than the 
care provided to family and friends (Wilson, 2000). At first sight, the idea of 
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volunteering, that is, any activity in which time is given freely to benefit 
another person, group or organization, implies selfless benevolent engage-
ment for the larger society (Wilson, 2012: 182). However, it would be mis-
leading to always think of volunteering as an entirely internalized norm of 
altruism. As Wilson (2000: 215) specifies, the above definition does not 
preclude volunteers from benefiting from their work. It appears that many 
volunteers’ motivations cannot be neatly classified as either altruistic or 
egoistic, both because some specific motives combine other-interested and 
self-interested considerations and because many people indicate that they 
have both kinds of reasons for volunteering (Clary and Snyder, 1999: 157). 
Moreover, volunteering could take many forms, each inspired by a different 
set of norms, values and attitudes (Wilson, 2000: 219).
Accordingly, with respect to voluntary engagement, one has initially to 
differentiate between formal voluntary work and informal volunteering or 
simply helping out (Ammann, 2001; Bühlmann and Freitag, 2005; 
Gallagher, 1994; Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2007, 2010; Traunmüller et al., 
2012; Wilson and Musick, 1997). Formal volunteering describes any volun-
tary activity, which occurs within the framework of a formal organization or 
association. Informal volunteering captures any voluntary activity that takes 
place outside formalized structures such as organizations, but also outside 
one’s own household. Thus, formal volunteering might involve unpaid 
coaching of soccer practice or handing out flyers at a public campaigning 
event. While formal volunteering through organizations that recruit and 
organize volunteers is an adequate (and frequently used) indicator for social 
cohesion, so too is informal voluntary engagement. Informal volunteering 
refers to activities such as helping and supporting friends, neighbours, 
acquaintances and relatives (outside of one’s own household) that take place 
directly between the people involved and outside of any formally organized 
structure (Gundelach et al., 2010). Examples of informal volunteering are 
mowing the neighbours’ lawn or watching their children.3
How do the different types of volunteering relate to the distinction 
between strategic and altruistic reciprocity? A first answer is given by the 
degree of obligation, which is attributed to the different kinds of volunteer-
ing. Here, “obligations have a more powerful influence on informal volun-
teering than they do on formal unpaid work” (Wilson and Musick, 1997: 
700). While in formal volunteer work individuals do not feel obligated to 
give a certain service to a certain person (Wuthnow, 1991: 95), in informal 
helping the donor and recipient are likely to have a relationship that entails 
commitments (Amato, 1990: 31). Secondly, recent research on volunteering 
uncovers clear differences in the motivational structure underlying these 
two types of volunteering: while formal volunteering is often driven by self-
centred motives such as hedonistic (“having fun”) or egoistic (recognition, 
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reward) reasons, altruistic motivations (e.g. “helping others”) appear to be 
more important in the field of informal volunteering (Clary et al., 1996; 
Freitag and Traunmüller, 2008: 231; Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010: 88; 
Wilson and Musick, 1997: 695). According to functional approaches and 
the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI), informal volunteers’ motives, in 
contrast to those of formal voluntary workers, correspond more to “values” 
(I feel it is important to help others) and “understanding” (volunteering lets 
me learn through direct hands-on experience), and less to selfish orienta-
tions such as “enhancement” (volunteering makes me feel better about 
myself) and “career” (volunteering can help me to get my foot in the door at 
a place where I would like to work) (Clary et al., 1996: 496). Moreover, a 
closer look at the most important fields of activity of formal and informal 
volunteering reveals that most formal volunteering is allotted to organiza-
tional and administrative activities (Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010: 50), 
whereas informal volunteering generally involves personal help to others, 
including caring activities (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2008; Stadelmann-
Steffen et al., 2010: 71).4 Against this background, we expect strategic and 
altruistic forms of reciprocity to be related to types of voluntary engagement 
that are driven by corresponding motivations and internalized norms of 
obligations (see Table 1). Thus, and in line with Putnam’s (2000: 118) 
observation that “altruistic behaviours tend to go together”, we assume that 
the norm of altruistic reciprocity is clearly related to informal volunteering, 
which reflects in our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals reporting high levels of altruistic reciprocity 
are likely to engage in informal volunteering.
Formal volunteer work, again, typically contributes to a collective good 
(e.g. picking up litter in parks) that makes society better, usually through an 
organization (Wilson and Musick, 1997: 700). Thus, formal volunteering gen-
erally implies some kind of benevolent engagement for the larger society. 
Nevertheless, as already mentioned above, formal volunteering is often driven 
by egocentric motivations. We therefore might expect attitudes towards stra-
tegic reciprocity to be related to this kind of voluntary work. It has to be noted, 
however, that formal volunteering comprises different forms of civic engage-
ment in a broad variety of distinct societal associations, such as political par-
ties, churches, sports clubs or humanitarian and environmental organizations. 
Moreover, voluntary associations do not always have the same effects and 
there is thus a need for further theoretical and empirical differentiation (Stolle 
and Rochon, 1998; Warren, 2001; Zmerli, 2003).
In other words, associational diversity raises the question whether the 
motives of formal volunteering are indeed as uniform as implied above, or 
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whether the different types of formal volunteering rather reflect distinct 
individual motivations (cf. Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010: 90). In this 
regard, our fundamental expectation is that voluntary associations directed 
to different purposes will attract different sorts of human beings. Based on 
these considerations, we differentiate between solidary and non-solidary 
associations. Non-solidary associations in particular secure advantage for 
their clientele and pursue individual material goods, which are individual, 
scarce and excludable. Sports clubs, interest groups, leisure organizations, 
civil service and political groups are assigned to this category. Solidary 
associations pursue inclusive social goods, characterized as social, non-
scarce and non-excludable. Religious associations, charitable organiza-
tions, cultural clubs, human rights and environmental organizations belong 
to this category (cf. Warren, 2001; Zmerli, 2003). Thus, it can be assumed 
that attitudes towards altruistic reciprocity lead to formal volunteering in 
associations pursuing socially inclusive purposes. In contrast, selfish and 
strategic motivations are expected to relate to formal volunteering in 
organizations devoted to non-solidary goods, such as material goods. 
Based on these considerations we formulate two additional hypotheses on 
the relationship between the type of reciprocity and different types of for-
mal volunteering:
Hypothesis 2a: Individuals reporting high levels of strategic reciprocity 
are more likely to engage in formal volunteering within non-solidary 
associations.
Hypothesis 2b: Individuals reporting high levels of altruistic reciprocity 
are more likely to engage in formal volunteering within socially inclu-
sive associations.
Finally, we assume that individuals reporting high levels of altruistic 
reciprocity and a specific sense of obligation do not necessarily engage 
in non-solidary formal volunteering where hedonistic and egocentric, 
meaning selfish motives play an important role. In a similar vein, stra-
tegic reciprocity is probably of little help to explain engagement in soli-
dary associations as well as informal voluntary engagement, which 
often involves helping behaviours and internalized norms of commit-
ment or obligation. Based on these expectations, we formulate a third 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: There is no positive relationship between altruist reciproc-
ity and the individual likeliness to do voluntary work within non-solidary 
associations. In a similar vein, we do not expect a positive relationship 
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between strategic reciprocity and the individual propensity for informal 
volunteering as well as voluntary work within solidary associations.
Table 1 summarizes our theoretical expectations representing all possi-
ble combinations between the two types of reciprocity and two forms and 
kinds of volunteering, respectively.
Table 1. The relation between reciprocity and volunteering.
Volunteering
Informal Formal
Non-solidary/solidary
Reciprocity Strategic * + / *
Altruistic + * / +
Note: + = positive relation; * = non-positive relation.
Data, variables and methodological approach
To test our hypotheses we base our analysis on the Swiss Volunteering Survey 
2009 (Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010). Depending on the model estimated, 
the final sample from the Swiss Volunteering Survey comprises between 1749 
and 5777 Swiss and non-national respondents in the 26 Swiss cantons. The 
individuals in the cantons were randomly chosen and questioned by means of 
computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI). In order to obtain a suffi-
ciently high number of respondents for each subnational unit, the random 
sample was stratified disproportionally among cantons.
Our dependent variable is whether or not an individual does unpaid vol-
untary work within (formal volunteering) or outside (informal volunteering) 
of an organization or association. With regard to formal volunteering, we 
further distinguish the kind of organization, that is, whether it pursues non-
solidary as opposed to solidary purposes. The measurement of formal volun-
teering refers to the reported formal voluntary engagement as indicated by 
the Swiss Volunteering Survey 2009: “We would now like to ask you about 
all the voluntary or honorary work you did for any associations, organiza-
tions, or public institutions over the past four weeks. Have you carried out 
one or more activities of this type?”5 To test hypothesis 2 we confine the 
analyses to formal volunteers by distinguishing between formal engagement 
conducted predominantly for non-solidary associations on the one hand and 
for associations following mainly a solidary or socially inclusive purpose on 
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the other hand. We define formal volunteering for political associations, pub-
lic office, sports clubs, interest groups, leisure organizations and civil service 
as non-solidary, whereas formal volunteering for religious associations, 
charitable organizations, cultural clubs and human rights and environmental 
organizations are considered solidary or socially inclusive associations.6 
When interested in the general likelihood of non-solidary formal volunteer-
ing, we distinguish between formal volunteers in non-solidary organizations 
(coded 1) versus all remaining respondents, that is, volunteers of solidary 
associations, informal volunteers and non-volunteers (coded 0). With regard 
to the general likelihood of voluntary work within solidary associations, we 
analogously differentiate between volunteering in solidary organizations (1) 
and all other respondents (0) (see Models 2 and 3, Table 2 in the results sec-
tion). In addition, we also focus on the choice between different kinds of 
formal voluntary engagement, considering the mere likelihood of non-soli-
dary volunteering (coded 1) as opposed to solidary formal engagement 
(coded 0) (see Model 4, Table 3 in the results section).7
We measure informal volunteering with the following question: “In addi-
tion to formal volunteering in associations and other organizations, there are 
alternative opportunities for volunteering. Did you perform another type of 
unpaid work beyond volunteering in associations or other organizations, 
such as babysitting (children other than your own), neighbourly-aid, partici-
pating in any kind of projects, organizing a (street) party in your neighbour-
hood, etc. in the last four weeks? (The work has to be for the benefit of 
people outside one’s own household)”. Respondents indicating informal 
voluntary engagement were allocated the values of 1, while all others were 
assigned the value 0.
As for our central independent variable, reciprocity, respondents were 
asked to indicate their agreement with specific statements on a scale ranging 
from 0 (no agreement) to 10 (total agreement). Altruistic reciprocity is 
measured by respondents’ agreement to the following statement of the 
Swiss Volunteering Survey 2009: “I take particular effort to help someone 
who has helped me in the past”, whereas strategic reciprocity is captured by 
respondents’ agreement to the statement: “helping someone is the best 
method to be certain that one will receive help in the future”. In our view, 
these items come very close to what we intend to measure. The statement “I 
take particular effort to help someone who has helped me in the past” 
implies compensation for past goodwill, but no explicit strategic incentives, 
meaning no expectations regarding the future behaviour of others and there-
fore corresponding to the concept of altruistic reciprocity. By contrast, the 
statement “to help someone is the best way to be certain that one will receive 
help in the future” clearly indicates a strategic motivation of reciprocal 
behaviour. In these instances, social interactions are not one-shot games, but 
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ego expects a reward in iterated social exchanges (Diekmann, 2004: 489). 
Additional factor analyses not presented here, which include motivational 
variables of volunteering as well as the two reciprocity variables, support 
the construct validity of our measurements for reciprocity. According to 
these results, altruistic reciprocity indeed coincides with the motivation to 
help, whereas strategic reciprocity loads highest on the factor denoting ego-
centric motivations of volunteering.
One could further argue that our analyses are somewhat flawed since we 
face the problem of endogeneity between reciprocity and volunteering, as it 
may be possible that volunteers develop attitudes towards the norms of reci-
procity. We have to admit that due to our research design we cannot clarify 
this causality question as we would need panel or time series data to solve 
this problem. Nevertheless, we want to point out that we focus on voluntary 
activities that took place in the last four weeks (cf. survey items above), 
assuming that reciprocal attitudes take more than four weeks to develop and 
thus precede the voluntary activities captured by the survey.
In order to explain formal and informal volunteering, we further build on 
former research on the determinants of individual volunteering and inte-
grate the following socio-demographic individual characteristics into the 
analysis (cf. Nollert and Huser, 2007; Salamon and Sokolowski, 2003: 77; 
Wilson, 2000; Wilson and Musick, 1997): gender, age and nationality. In 
line with the expectation that volunteering requires resources in terms of 
time, as well as human, social and cultural capital, we furthermore account 
for employment and educational status, trust and social networks, and reli-
gious affiliation (cf. Putnam, 2000; Sundeen et al., 2007; Wilson and 
Janoski, 1995; Wilson and Musick, 1997). Since people are more likely to 
volunteer if they have local roots, we add homeownership as well as resi-
dential stability, that is, how long the respondent has lived at his or her cur-
rent residence (Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag, 2011; Wilson, 2012). At the 
contextual level, a canton’s degree of urbanization as well as the language 
region is integrated into the models, as these contextual factors have proven 
to be important in explaining volunteering in Switzerland (Baglioni, 2004; 
Bühlmann and Freitag, 2007; Kriesi, 2004; Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 
2010). We use the values of the contextual factors measured prior to 2009 to 
assure that the potential cause precedes the effect. More detailed informa-
tion on all variables (operationalization and sources) as well as descriptive 
statistics can be found in Table 4 in the Appendix.
Methodologically, we apply random intercept models, implying that 
individual behaviour can vary between cantons (Jones, 1997; Steenbergen 
and Jones, 2002). In addition, such multilevel models allow for the model-
ling of macro-level characteristics (in the present case, of the contextual 
11
control variables at the cantonal level). As the dependent variable is dichot-
omous, individual volunteering of immigrants is transformed into a logit 
structure. A Bayesian estimation approach is used, which has shown to 
perform better than maximum likelihood, particularly when employing 
multilevel models faced with a small number of level 2 units (Browne and 
Draper, 2006). What is more, in Bayesian estimation, uncertainty does not 
represent relative frequencies, but the conviction to make use of the best 
explanatory model for the observations at hand (Gill, 2008: 2). Since Swiss 
cantons constitute no random sample but the population of all possible 
cantons, the Bayesian approach is more appropriate here than frequentist 
estimation techniques.
For an easy interpretation of the Bayesian estimation results, we pro-
vide the mean and the 95 per cent credible interval of the posterior distri-
bution, which can be interpreted as in a standard regression situation. The 
mean is the average effect of an independent variable on the outcome 
variable and the credible interval, the Bayesian analogue to confidence 
intervals in a standard regression context (cf. Bräuninger et al., 2010; 
Hangartner et al., 2007), gives a sense of the statistical reliability of this 
estimate.
Even though Bayesian MCMC estimators8 are guaranteed to converge 
with an infinite number of iterations, the finite iterations we run in our anal-
ysis require that we assess (non-) convergence (Hangartner et al., 2007: 
626). We conducted several visual checks to test for signs of non-conver-
gence (cf. Gill, 2008: 463ff; Tiao and Box, 1973). In a first step, we inspected 
the trajectories of every single parameter for signs of lacking convergence. 
We then controlled all parameters for auto- or cross-correlation. Finally, we 
tested whether the posterior distributions for each parameter indeed take a 
unimodal shape like they are supposed to.
Empirical results
In this section we subject our theory-derived relationships to empirical tests, 
with a focus on the influence of reciprocity on the development of informal 
and formal volunteering. We will present four different models, each with 
different concepts of reciprocity and volunteering. The first model measures 
the impact of strategic and altruistic reciprocity on informal volunteering, 
while Models 2 and 3 estimate the consequences of the two types of reci-
procity on formal volunteering for non-solidary associations and for soli-
dary associations, respectively (see Table 2).9 Models 1–3 comprise all 
respondents of the sample, as they ask for the general likelihood of informal 
and formal volunteering in (non-)solidary associations compared to all 
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other forms of (non-)engagement. By contrast, in the last Model (4) shown 
in Table 3 the focus shifts to the probability of choosing a specific kind of 
formal volunteering (i.e. non-solidary versus solidary) once an individual 
opted for formal voluntary engagement. The main results can be described 
as follows.10
— First and foremost, as for our main explanatory variable reciprocity, 
the results of Table 2 are mainly in line with our theoretical expecta-
tions, thereby supporting our differentiated conceptual approach. A 
closer look at Models 1 and 2 reveals that there is neither a relation-
ship between strategic reciprocity and the likeliness to engage in 
informal volunteering, nor does altruistic reciprocity coincide with 
the likeliness for formal volunteering in non-solidary associations, 
thus corroborating our third hypothesis. More importantly, individu-
als reporting high levels of altruistic reciprocity are more likely to 
engage in informal volunteering (Model 1), which corresponds to 
our hypothesis 1. According to these results, the probability that an 
individual reporting high values of altruistic reciprocity (10) engages 
in informal volunteering is 11 per cent higher compared to a person 
exhibiting identical individual characteristics but low values of 
altruistic reciprocity (0).11 Accordingly, while individuals often 
engage in informal volunteering in order to help others, the deeper 
root of this helping motivation might be attributed to the fact that 
these same individuals received help in the past, which they now 
want to give back to the society.
— Turning to formal volunteering for non-solidary associations, Model 
2 in Table 2 shows that the general likelihood of individuals choos-
ing this kind of organizational engagement is not affected by strate-
gic reciprocity. The coefficient for this relationship is positive, but 
the credible interval crosses the zero line, meaning that the relation-
ship is not statistically reliable. In a similar vein, Model 3 displays a 
positive coefficient between altruistic reciprocity and formal volun-
teering in solidary associations, which is, however, not statistically 
reliable. While these findings contradict our expectation outlined in 
hypothesis 2, the negative and relevant coefficient for strategic reci-
procity and formal volunteering in solidary associations meets our 
expectation outlined in hypothesis 3. In substantial terms this effect 
is rather modest: the probability that a person indicating high values 
of strategic reciprocity (10) engages in solidary formal volunteering 
is 4.5 per cent lower compared to a person with low levels of strate-
gic reciprocity (0).
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Table 2. Reciprocity and volunteering (all respondents).
Informal 
volunteering
Formal volunteering 
Non-solidary Solidary
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FIXED EFFECTS
Constant −1.77
[–2.40:–1.16]
−2.73
[–3.41:–2.05]
−3.15
[–3.88:–2.34]
Individual level
Strategic
reciprocity
−0.01
[–0.04:0.01]
0.03
[–0.01:0.05]
−0.05
[–0.08:–0.02]
Altruistic
reciprocity
0.04
[0.01:0.07]
0.02
[–0.03:0.06]
0.01
[–0.03:0.05]
Sex (ref.cat.: male) 0.40
[0.27:0.53]
−0.64
[–0.82:–0.47]
0.26
[0.07:0.44]
Age −0.01
[–0.01:–0.004]
−0.02
[–0.02:–0.01]
−0.002
[–0.01:0.004]
Immigrant −0.25
[–0.45:–0.04]
−0.91
[–1.24:–0.58]
−0.63
[–0.99:–0.29]
Education (ref.cat.:
medium education)
Low education −0.46
[–0.64:–0.28]
−0.59
[–0.86:–0.32]
−0.56
[–0.86:–0.28]
High education −0.02
[–0.17:0.13]
−0.03
[–0.22:0.16]
0.63
[0.44:0.82]
Employment (ref. cat.:
part-time)
Full-time
employment
−0.36
[–0.53:–0.19]
0.01
[–0.11:0.32]
−0.36
[–0.59:–0.13]
Not employed −0.04
[–0.20:0.12]
−0.39
[–0.60:–0.16]
−0.09
[–0.29:0.13]
Trust 0.04
[0.01:0.06]
0.07
[0.03:0.10]
0.10
[0.06:0.14]
Social network 0.09
[0.05:0.14]
0.23
[0.16:0.30]
0.10
[0.03:0.17]
(Continued)
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Informal 
volunteering
Formal volunteering 
Non-solidary Solidary
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Residential
stability
0.02
[–0.05:0.09]
0.08
[–0.02:0.16]
0.17
[0.06:0.27]
Homeowner 0.19
[0.07:0.31]
0.35
[0.20:0.51]
0.10
[–0.07:0.26]
Religious affiliation
(ref.cat.: Prot. and 
other)
Catholic −0.03
[–0.16:0.09]
−0.02
[–0.17:0.15]
−0.08
[–0.25:0.09]
Muslim −0.13
[–0.70:0.41]
−3.17
[–6.26:–1.25]
−0.71
[–1.99:0.31]
None −0.04
[–0.23:0.14]
−0.32
[–0.56:–0.07]
−0.70
[–0.98:–0.43]
Contextual level
Urbanization −0.06
[–0.18:0.07]
−0.34
[–0.50:–0.18]
−0.26
[–0.44:–0.07]
Share German
speaking
0.004
[0.002:0.006]
0.01
[0.002:0.008]
0.00
[–0.004:0.004]
RANDOM EFFECTS
Contextual variance 0.002 
[0.001:0.01]
0.01 
[0.001:0.05]
0.04 
[0.002:0.13]
N 5772 5777 5777
DIC 7024.26 4802.31 4370.73
Table 2. (Continued)
Note: Mean posterior distributions of log-odds, and 95% credible interval (squared brackets); 
all models were calculated in MlwiN using MCMC estimation (15,000 iterations, burn-in 
1000, diffuse [gamma] priors); no signs of non-convergence.
The partial confirmation of our theoretical expectations suggests that the 
decision to engage in non-solidary/solidary formal volunteering as opposed 
to all other forms of (non-)engagement depends, besides individual norms 
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of reciprocity, on specific forms of individual capital (social, human) and 
socio-demographic characteristics (see below). Yet, as elaborated in our 
theoretical section, varying individual motives are clearly related to differ-
ent kinds of formal volunteering. Accordingly, once an individual has opted 
for organizational volunteering, motivational factors should be decisive for 
her choice of a specific kind of formal voluntary engagement (cf. Clary 
et al., 1996).
— Based on these considerations, we conducted the same analysis as in 
Model 2 for formal volunteers only (Model 4 in Table 3).12 The find-
ings presented in Model 4 corroborate our theoretical expectation, and 
thus, hypothesis 2: when considering formal volunteers only, the like-
liness for non-solidary engagement is indeed higher for individuals 
reporting high values of strategic reciprocity, whereas there is still no 
relationship between altruistic reciprocity and formal volunteering in 
associations mainly pursuing individual material goods. The calcula-
tion of predicted probabilities reveals a considerable effect of reci-
procity on volunteering: the probability that a person indicating high 
strategic reciprocity (10) engages in non-solidary as opposed to soli-
dary formal volunteering is 14 per cent higher compared to an indi-
vidual with very low levels of strategic reciprocity (0).
Table 3. Reciprocity and non-solidary formal volunteering (formal volunteers only).
Non-solidary formal 
volunteering
Model 4
FIXED EFFECTS
Constant 0.56 [−0.42:1.65]
Individual level
Strategic reciprocity 0.06 [0.02:0.10]
Altruistic reciprocity 0.02 [−0.04:0.08]
Sex (ref.cat.: male) −0.78 [−1.03:–0.54]
Age −0.02 [−0.02:–0.01]
Immigrant −0.08 [−0.56:0.41]
Education (ref.cat.: medium education)
Low education −0.09 [−0.48:0.31]
High education −0.49 [−0.74:–0.62]
(Continued)
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— With respect to the control factors, the empirical results in Table 2 
largely corroborate the findings of existing research on volunteer-
ing. Accordingly, the likeliness of formal volunteering (Model 2) is 
higher for educated young Swiss males with employment (cf. 
Salamon and Sokolowski, 2003; Wilson, 2000). Furthermore, 
locally rooted individuals indicating an elevated frequency of social 
contacts as well as high levels of interpersonal trust are more likely 
to engage in formal volunteering (cf. Stadelmann-Steffen and 
Freitag, 2011), whereas this likelihood is lower for Muslim respond-
ents (cf. Joppke, 2010; Statham et al., 2005) and undenominational 
individuals. A look at the contextual variables shows finally that the 
Non-solidary formal 
volunteering
Model 4
Employment (ref. cat.: part-time)
Full-time employment 0.25 [−0.06:0.56]
Not employed −0.26 [−0.54:0.03]
Trust −0.04 [−0.10:0.01]
Social network 0.09 [0.002:0.19]
Residential stability −0.05 [−0.17:0.08]
Homeowner 0.22 [−0.01:0.44]
Religious affiliation (ref.cat.: Protestant and other)
Catholic −0.02 [−0.24:0.21]
Muslim −2.36 [−5.78:0.10]
None 0.31 [−0.06:0.67]
Contextual level
Urbanization −0.05 [−0.27:0.15]
Share German speaking 0.01 [0.001:0.01]
RANDOM EFFECTS
Contextual level variance 0.01 [0.001:0.07]
N 1749
DIC 2263.08
Note: Mean posterior distributions of log-odds, and 95% credible interval (squared brackets); 
all models were calculated in MlwiN using MCMC estimation (15,000 iterations, burn-in 
1000, diffuse [gamma] priors); no signs of non-convergence.
Table 3. (Continued)
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likelihood of formal volunteering is higher in rural than in urban 
areas and that it is particularly widespread in German-speaking 
Switzerland (Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010). Thus, our findings 
corroborate the scholarly consensus according to which formal vol-
unteering requires individual resources in terms of social and human 
capital, which explains why men are still more likely to engage in 
formal volunteering than women and why this likeliness is lower for 
unemployed individuals. This picture is largely confirmed consider-
ing contextual and individual determinants of solidary formal volun-
teering (Model 3) as well as informal volunteering (Model 1). Unlike 
non-solidary formal volunteering, but similar to informal volunteer-
ing, women are more likely to engage in solidary formal engage-
ment. Whereas the same holds for highly educated individuals, a 
full-time employment hampers the likeliness for solidary formal 
engagement. When it comes to informal volunteering, the explana-
tory power of the individual variables is slightly weaker, indicating 
that individual resources are a less important precondition for this 
form of volunteering, which is, again, in line with existing research 
(cf. Nollert and Huser, 2007). This assumption, however, cannot be 
extended to individual time resources, since they appear as a rele-
vant condition for informal and solidary formal volunteering 
(Models 1 and 3), where engagement is less likely among people 
with full-time employment. Lower individual resources as well as 
higher scores in altruism and empathy attributed to socialization 
processes are also often mentioned as an explanation for women’s 
higher informal engagement (and, analogously, solidary formal 
engagement) compared to men (cf. Wilson, 2000). A look at Model 
4 in Table 3 finally shows that socio-demographic characteristics 
and the individual stock of human and social capital are least deci-
sive in explaining individual choices between different kinds of for-
mal volunteering, thus supporting our assumption that this decision 
tends to be driven by motivational factors.
Conclusion
This paper addressed the question whether volunteering bears the marking of 
purely altruistic and selfless motives, or whether egocentric motivations 
might also initiate voluntary engagement. In contrast to existing research, 
which has provided ambiguous answers to this question, we claim that while 
clear-cut statements are possible, they require a more differentiated theoreti-
cal conceptualization of the complex terms reciprocity and volunteering to 
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facilitate the formulation and testing of more subtle hypotheses. Our basic 
argument renders earlier ways of thinking more precise and overcomes pre-
vious analytical deficits. Consequently, our conceptual foundation is able to 
produce a more appropriate model to explain the formation of volunteering.
The empirical evidence resulting from our Bayesian multilevel analyses 
supports our differentiated approach: based on a theoretical framework of 
reciprocity and volunteering, we have been able to gain more concise 
insights into the relationship between the two concepts. More specifically, 
our findings suggest that individual informal volunteering, which is occa-
sionally referred to as “informal helping” (cf. Wilson, 2000; Wilson and 
Musick, 1997), does indeed coincide with high personal levels of altruistic 
reciprocity. In addition, we find that high levels of strategic reciprocity are 
only related to formal volunteering in non-solidary as opposed to solidary 
organizations. This finding confirms our assumption that the general cate-
gory of formal volunteering is too complex in order to establish a clear 
relationship with a specific form of reciprocity, as it embraces disparate 
types of engagement based on distinct motivations. By contrast, we found a 
negative relationship between strategic reciprocity and the likelihood for 
solidary formal volunteering, whereas altruistic reciprocity is not related to 
formal volunteering for non-solidary associations, nor is strategic reciproc-
ity to informal volunteering.
The differentiated findings presented in this paper contradict purist 
scholars: neither is volunteering an entirely altruist and selfless activity (cf. 
Putnam, 2000), nor does it always represent an egocentric, rational action 
assessed by a cost–benefit analysis (cf. Smith, 1981). According to our 
results, depending on the kind of volunteering one examines, volunteering 
implies both altruist and egocentric motivations.
Overall, our findings bear important implications for the motivational 
research on volunteering. Reciprocity and volunteering are not contradic-
tory concepts; it rather appears that voluntary engagement depends on indi-
viduals’ reciprocal attitudes. Thus, help received in the past might motivate 
individuals in the form of altruistic reciprocity to pay back this good to the 
larger society and engage in informal volunteering. Furthermore, the belief 
that helping someone is the best way to receive help in the future, that is, 
strategic reciprocity, may trigger the decision to engage in formal voluntary 
engagement for associations pursuing individual material goods. Future 
research could show whether these positive relationships between specific 
forms of reciprocity and volunteering are more (or less) salient for specific 
groups, that is, if they moderate individual propensities to volunteer linked 
to socio-demographic characteristics. For instance, one might expect that 
norms of reciprocity motivate specific groups to engage in volunteering, 
19
such as people with low levels of education or immigrants, two groups that 
would otherwise have a low propensity to volunteer. In this way, one could 
test Gouldner’s (1960) classical assumption that reciprocity acts as a start-
ing mechanism of social cooperation in consolidating societies, such as, for 
instance, contemporary immigration societies. From a larger societal per-
spective, these examples show that the reciprocal concept “what goes 
around comes around” remains an important principle of human interaction, 
which facilitates cooperation as it contributes to the social capital and, thus, 
the social cohesion of societies. Considering the socially integrative poten-
tial of volunteering, our findings underscore the importance of the transfer 
of reciprocal values, be it through education in school or at home or through 
everyday social exchanges.
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Notes
1. We focus on altruistic and strategic variants of reciprocity in order to gain fur-
ther insight into the relevance of self-centred versus other-centred motives for
volunteering at the individual level. Yet, other forms of reciprocity also matter
for the decision to volunteer, for instance generalized reciprocity when it comes 
to explain volunteering at the community level (cf. Eckstein, 2001; Mauss,
[1950]1990).
2. Note that our understanding of altruistic reciprocity corresponds to Diekmann’s 
(2004) narrow and particularistic, that is, person-specific, definition of the term. 
A broader understanding is used by Berger (2013: 31), who defines altruistic
reciprocity as “the unconditional tendency of ego to return any experienced
action, no matter if the receiver is the same person ego has received the action
from or not”. In our view, such an encompassing definition blurs the crucial
distinction between generalized and altruistic reciprocity.
3. Informal voluntary activity is generally per definition an activity that takes
place in the proximate social surroundings. We are, however, well aware, that
– at least theoretically – there are possible situations in which this type of vol-
unteering takes place beyond one’s immediate community.
4. Wilson and Musick (1997) support this varying motivational pattern indirectly
when they explain females’ higher propensity to engage in informal volunteer-
ing with typical socialization patterns according to which women score higher
on measures of altruism and empathy than men.
5. The list of possible associations is confined to sports clubs, cultural clubs,
church or church-like associations, interest groups, leisure organizations, chari-
table organizations, civil service, human rights and environmental organiza-
tions and political organizations (see Codebook in Table 4 of the Appendix).
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6. We do so by recoding the following question: “As for your formal voluntary
engagement, please indicate the organization or association in which you spend 
most time for formal volunteering”.
7. Our categorization of solidary and non-solidary associations follows the
insights of Warren (2001), who offers a more subtle differentiation of volun-
tary associations depending on the purpose they pursue (see also Zmerli, 2003). 
Certainly, most organizations pursue multiple goals (Janoski and Wilson, 1995: 
275); however, almost every organization can be assigned a main purpose,
and we think that this criterion allows us to clearly distinguish solidary from
non-solidary objectives as primary purposes of organizations. Our categoriza-
tion largely corresponds to Janoski and Wilson’s (1995) distinction between
self-oriented versus community-oriented organizations, albeit with one nota-
ble difference: while Janoski and Wilson (1995) view service organizations as
community-oriented, we classify civil service organizations (e.g. firefighters)
as non-solidary volunteering, since the primary purpose of these organizations
is not solidarity, but to provide specific services to the community. What is
more, our classification of organizational purposes does not necessarily overlap 
with individual purposes. While an individual might view volunteering for her
party as either solidary or not explicitly solidary volunteering, the purpose of
parties is not primarily solidarity, but rather the advocacy of the party ideology.
8. MCMC stands for “Markov Chain Monte Carlo”, the standard estimation tech-
niques for statistical Bayesian analysis (cf. Gill, 2008: chapters 8 and 9).
9. Additional models not reported here prove that there is no relationship between 
altruistic or strategic reciprocity and formal volunteering. These results corrob-
orate our implicit assumption that formal volunteering embraces very diverse
forms of associational involvement reflecting very distinct individual motiva-
tions, thereby making it impossible to establish clear relationships between
specific norms of reciprocity and formal volunteering.
10. Additional robustness test models based on alternative classifications such
as caring versus non-caring volunteering as well as community-centred ver-
sus self-centred voluntary organizations (Janoski and Wilson, 1995) do not
alter the findings reported here (analyses available upon request). We would
like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments in this
respect.
11. All predicted probabilities reported in this paper are calculated based on aver-
age individual characteristics, that is, for a middle-aged female Protestant
Swiss homeowner, with medium education and part-time employment, exhibit-
ing average values of trust, social networks and residential stability (cf. Table 4
in the Appendix) and living in an urban and German-speaking canton.
12. In this estimation, we consider the mere likelihood of non-solidary volunteer-
ing (coded 1) as opposed to solidary formal engagement (coded 0).
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